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## LINGUISTIC REPRESENTATION OF THE 'TELOS'-BASED REFLECTIVE SENSE IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE

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The suggested notion of teleological reflective sense in this enquiry is posited as linguistic or mental representation of the 'purpose' related moral propriety of an utterance. The conceptual and terminological apparatus of moral teleology is used with a utilitarianist touch for the appraisal of political statements in current political discourse with reference to the basic notion of teleology – the final purpose ('Telos'). Specifically, teleological reflective sense is viewed as the product of 'deep interpretation', as ascribed teleological reflective constituents of meaning in addition to what the proposition of the original utterance refers to. Reflection, along with intuitively engendered meanings, is an intrinsic human attribute. The ascription of teleological reflective sense to the utterance occurs as a result of teleological reflection and intuitive 'insights', heuristic semantic 'constructs' associated with the embedded moral code. In the domain of I. Kant's moral teleology, teleological reflection denotes moral assessment of actions from the point of underlying purposes, motives or consequences. Linguistic representations of facts of reality in political discourse are subject to teleological reflective judgement and to meaning attribution in line with the tenets of moral teleology. The ascription of an 'additional' meaning may signify the semantic, moral and ethical mismatch between the intended 'speaker's meaning' and the meaning recovered by the addressee. Teleological reflection is latent and tacit as mental representation of the fact of reality, but in political discourse it may assume linguistic representation in the form of teleological explanations, descriptive digressions, commentaries or relevant analytical texts. Without discarding the plausibility of minimalist treatment of meaning, we tend to rely on the teleological methodology and heuristic principles of contextualism, given the opacity of the concept of 'Telos' and fluidity of moral premisses.

Linguistic representations of teleological assumptions in political discourse may express purposefulness explicitly, implicitly or in the form of the overt and covert reflective sense ascribed to the utterance. The number of teleological reflective senses that can be assigned to an utterance is potentially infinite. This fact is accounted for by incalculable objective, subjective, dependent and independent 'Telos' related variables. Teleological reflection which brings about meaning creation in political discourse is essentially meta-teleological since it represents the teleological reflective judgement about the moral propriety of somebody else's reflection. For reasons of moral impropriety or political expediency covert teleological assumptions eliciting meaning attribution may be left latent and unarticulated creating semantic gaps to be filled in by the addressee.

## ЛІНГВІСТИЧНА РЕПРЕЗЕНТАЦІЯ ТЕЛЕОЛОГІЧНОГО РЕФЛЕКСІЙНОГО СМISЛУ У ПОЛІТИЧНОМУ ДИСКУРСІ

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**Ключові слова:** телеологічне судження, моральна телеологія, евристика, інтуїтивні характеристики істинності, атрибуція смислу, контекстуалізм, утилітаризм.

Запропоноване у цьому дослідженні поняття «телеологічний рефлексійний смисл» позначає ментальну або лінгвістичну репрезентацію відповідності висловлення морально-етичним канонам у співвіднесеності з висловленою або передбачуваною кінцевою метою комунікативної взаємодії. Концептуальний і термінологічний апарат моральної телеології використано з урахуванням базових утилітаристських положень щодо пріоритетності загальнолюдського блага. Телеологічний рефлексійний смисл як результат глибокого осмислення ('deeper interpretation') розглянуто як семантичне нашарування, котре додається до пропозиції оригінального висловлення під впливом об'єктивних і суб'єктивних чинників, узгоджених з ціннісно-цільовою схемою спілкування. Рефлексія, як і здатність до інтуїтивної атрибуції смислів, є суто людською властивістю. Приписування телеологічного рефлексійного смислу до сприйнятого висловлення є результатом телеологічної рефлексії та інтуїтивних імовірнісних семантичних побудов на основі усталених моральних канонів. Ми виходимо з того, що відповідно до постулатів моральної телеології І. Канта, телеологічна рефлексія втілюється у моральній оцінці дій і подій з точки зору цілей, мотивів або наслідків. Лінгвістичні репрезентації фактів реальності у політичному дискурсі як об'єкт телеологічного рефлексійного осмислення зазнають прирощення додаткових смислів відповідно до принципів моральної телеології. Приписування додаткового смислу може бути виявом семантичних і ціннісно-цільових розбіжностей між смислом висловлення, котрий хоче передати мовець ('speaker's meaning'), і смислом, котрий для себе формує адресат ('recovered meaning'). За природою телеологічна рефлексія як ментальна репрезентація факту реальності є прихованою, неартикульованою, але у політичному дискурсі вона може здобувати об'єктивне вираження у вигляді телеологічних пояснень, коментарів, аналітичних матеріалів. Не відкидаючи мінімалістського, композиційного принципу осмислення семантичної проблематики, ми схильні використовувати телеологічну методологію та евристичні принципи контекстуалістського гатунку з огляду на розмитість концепту 'Телос' і варіативність витлумачення моральних норм. Лінгвістичні репрезентації телеологічних складників смислу можуть виявляти ціннісно-цільові характеристики експліцитно, імпліцитно або у вигляді доданого рефлексійного смислу до оригінального висловлення. Кількість телеологічних рефлексійних смислів, котрі можуть бути доданими до висловлення, є потенційно безмежною. Цей факт пояснюється наявністю нескінченної кількості об'єктивних та суб'єктивних телеологічно релевантних змінних, здатних впливати на процес смислоутворення у політичному дискурсі. Телеологічна рефлексія, котра спричиняє смислоутворення у політичному дискурсі, за своєю сутністю є метателеологічною, оскільки вона є втіленням телеологічного рефлексійного судження щодо відповідності моральним

нормам рефлексійних процесів автора осмислюваного висловлення. З причин морально-етичної узгодженості або з огляду на політичну доцільність латентні телеологічні рефлексійні конституенти смислу можуть залишатися неартикульованими, створюючи семантичні прогалини, котрі заповнює адресат.

**Problem statement.** The teleological conception of the final cause, which admits teleological explanation, is “applicable in human affairs” [Russell, 1983, p. 84]. Moreover, teleological ethics in the form of “teleological threads” pertaining to the final goal and “values learning” appears to be indispensable for the adequate “whole brain” emulation of human reasoning in artificial intelligence [Bostrom, 2017, pp. 133, 235]. In the focus of this paper are the constituents of meaning, which are the outcome of teleological reflection. Teleology is about the final purpose, “end-point, aim, goal” (‘Telos’) of any entity or activity: of a living thing, or of “the system to which that thing belongs” [Moutner, 2005, pp. 611, 612]. Teleological reflection is understood as the assessment of ‘purpose’ related moral validity of facts of reality [Kant, 1987, p. 441]. Linguistic representations of facts of reality in political discourse are subject to teleological reflective judgement and, correspondingly, to meaning attribution according to the tenets of moral teleology. The term ‘linguistic representation’ is understood as “linguistic expression of psychological states” [Stampe, 2013, p. 701], or words associated “with mental pictures” [Crane, 1995, p. 769]. Thus, if mental representations of the world are rational, they are supposed to be purposeful in a covert or overt way. Along with reflective thinking, the blurry nature of purposefulness elicits, according to the terminology of A. M. Colman, the creation of “hypothetical constructs” and triggers intuitive “immediate insights” on the basis of a gut feeling on the part of the addressee. These psychological operations do more than just register the semantically relevant interplay of “observable variables”, but fulfil the additional meaning generating functions by creating “surplus meanings” [Colman, 2015, p. 358]. It is these phenomena of a gut feeling and subconscious insights which are beyond the Goliathan capabilities of artificial intelligence, at least for the time being. The modern era of digital technologies has demonstrated the critical importance of reflective, self-reflective and semi-conscious meaning creative operations. Reflection, along with intuitively engendered ‘hypothetical constructs’, is a characteristically human attribute. In A. Pope’s words, we “ascribe” to proper “all good” and to “improper, ill” [Pope, 1951, p. 191].

Empirical evidence suggests that linguistic representations of teleological assumptions in political discourse may reveal purposefulness

explicitly, implicitly or in the form of the overt and covert reflective sense ascribed to the original utterance. Moral aspects of purposefulness in political discourse may require scholarly attention for various reasons: (a) the notion of the final purpose is notoriously vague; (b) the opacity of the concept of morality is proverbial; (c) political decisions are at times made on the assumption that a ‘noble’ purpose justifies outrageously immoral means; (d) the moral standard of political debate has been deteriorating. We hold that all stated above makes scholarly pursuits in the domains of political discourse and moral teleology worthwhile.

#### **The hypothesis**

Teleological reflective judgement engenders the ascription to an utterance of an ‘additional’ teleological reflective sense, which goes beyond the semantic purport of the original minimalist proposition. Teleological reflective constituents of meaning in political discourse can be explicated, implicated or ascribed to an utterance. Covert teleological assumptions, hidden or craftily misplaced goals, or uncertain potential consequences serve as an added catalyst for putative conjectures about real ultimate goals of political statements and, accordingly, elicit the attribution of teleological reflective senses.

#### **The aim of this study**

The aim of this research is to identify discursive logically sustainable underpinnings of teleological reflective sense creation and to delineate the tentative set of semantically relevant variables stimulating the ascription of additional teleological reflective senses in political discourse.

#### **The object of this study**

The object of this enquiry is ‘Telos’-based reflective meaning creation in the English language political discourse of the last decade.

**The subject** is the teleologically determined semantic disparities between the speaker’s meaning and that recovered by the addressee.

#### **The empirical material**

The empirical material exemplifying the phenomenon of teleological reflective sense creation was selected from leading mass media resources of the last decade – newspapers, magazines, radio, television, the internet.

#### **The methodology**

The teleological method was employed for the investigation of teleological reflective constituents of meaning in political discourse. It is focused on

the analysis of deductive, inductive, inferential and intuitive factors of meaning creation brought about by teleological reflection. The teleological method developed by I. Kant is used to assess the morality of an action. The argumentative analysis and the basic methods of symbolic sentential logic were also applied in this research.

### Presentation of the main material Teleological reflective sense

Philosophers and linguists stress that recovery of meaning in a natural language in ordinary communicative interactions may be automatic, intuitive, “by default” [Daly, 2013, p. 174; Jaszczolt, 2023]. In the domain of ‘covert teleology’, the purpose or its moral justification may be left unarticulated but ascribed by the addressee as additional purpose-based reflective sense, which goes beyond a minimal propositional structure. In psychology and psycholinguistics, this “extended” and “expanded” interpretation of discourse that exceeds “the information literally contained” in the utterance is rightfully called “deep interpretation” or “rich interpretation” [Reber, Allen, Reber, 2009, p. 689]. To address these instances as purpose-based phenomena we introduce the notion of teleological reflective sense. It is posited in this account as the teleological appraisal of the referential ties indicated in the original assertion and as an aspect of meaning additional to what the utterance refers to (Fig. 1).

We view the teleological reflective sense ascribed by the addressee as intrinsically different from the speaker’s intended semantic content. Ascription of teleological reflective sense is inherently distinctive from the traditional understanding of the notion of reference, it is rather morally guided rearrangement of referential ties by the addressee.

The following examples illustrate the cases of attribution of teleological reflective sense in addition to what is referred to in an original utterance: *Emily Maitlis blasts BBC reporters for ‘distasteful’ reporting of allegations against Huw Edwards instead of going to HR – as friend says he was ‘surprised’ the broadcaster continued to investigate while ‘vulnerable’ presenter is in hospital* [The

Daily Mail. 2023. 14 July]. *A well-placed industry source claimed the report had felt ‘really aggressive and uncalled for’ given that the police had said there was no criminality involved* [The Daily Mail. 2023. 14 July]. The propositions of the listed utterances (*reporting was distasteful; the report felt aggressive and uncalled for*) exemplify the ascription of teleological reflective sense as passing teleological judgement on untimely and obviously morally flawed ongoing media scrutiny (*the broadcaster continued to investigate while ‘vulnerable’ presenter is in hospital; the police had said there was no criminality involved*). The same goes with indirect ‘semi-articulated’ hints or untoward suggestions as in the following instance concerning an unspecified “dig” by DeSantis at “Donald Trump’s record as president” [The Times. 2023. 26 May]. With due respect to prominent statesmen involved, we dare to presume that supporters and opponents may pass disparate teleological reflective judgements and assign different truth-values to the vague hints about President Trump’s tenure in the White House. The situation under consideration evokes the ideas of access semantics, contextualism and externalism in the theory of meaning. Contextualist and externalist theories specifically highlight the purpose-based semantic effect of Aristotelian ‘ethos’ or, in Plato’s terminology, ‘doxa’. In rhetoric, these terms denote a semantically relevant popular opinion of somebody or something, a track record of participants of communication, which may affect the ascription of truth-values to what is said [Aristotle, 1991; Thompson, 2016, p. 113].

For reasons of moral impropriety or political expediency covert teleological assumptions underpinning teleological reflective sense may be left latent and unarticulated in political discourse creating semantic gaps to be filled in by the addressee. To prove our point let’s look into the following examples: (a) *TV news presenter Huw Edwards has resigned from the BBC on “medical advice”, the corporation has said. <...>* (b) *We don’t believe it appropriate to comment further* [The BBC. 2024. 22 April]. Neither do we, for the same reason of possible moral impropriety of teleological reflective sense we may




Fig. 1. Attribution of teleological reflective sense to an utterance

be provoked to ascribe to this assertion. Nevertheless, this news may trigger the attribution of conflicting teleological reflective senses and judgements among readers, who remember various allegations circulating in tabloids. The utterance (b) is by itself a rare case of the articulated speaker's reflective sense, which indicates moral vulnerability of what is asserted by the speaker himself. Yet another instance of self-reflective assessment, kind of self-restraining introspection resulted in suspension of the current political debate for moral considerations. It was decided that further political statements are better left unarticulated for the time being, that it would be morally inappropriate to wage electoral wars at the time of an assassination attempt on the political opponent, e.g.: *Mr Biden election campaign paused all political statements <...>, clearly believing it would be inappropriate to attack Donald Trump at this time and instead concentrating on condemning what has happened* [The BBC. 2024. 14 July].

Though being predominantly latent, ascribed teleological reflective sense in political discourse may have ample linguistic representation in commentaries, letters, analytical materials. They may air the assessment of moral propriety and potential consequences of certain political actions and utterances. Thus, if mental representations of the world are rational, they are invariably 'purpose' related and reveal teleological assumptions: explicitly, implicitly or in the form of ascribed reflective sense. The analysed empirical data points to rather stochastic meaning creation alternatives as well as to potentially infinite discrepancies between an intended speaker's meaning and that recovered by the addressee. This mismatch can be caused by objective and subjective factors, triggering creation of additional purpose-based reflective senses the speaker might have never intended to bring home to the addressee.

The teleologically-based unintended constituents of the speaker's meaning can be actualized in discourse as the articulated ascribed semantic content engendered in the process of teleological reflection. For example, in the context of Iranian political narrative a phrase (a) "*defence pact*" is conventionally apprehended as a means (b) "*to offer some resistance to Israel*" [The Times. 2023. 5 May]. The linguistic representation of 'purpose' related reflective sense ascribed by the addressee to the phrase (a) sheds light on the alleged final purpose with a hint at the questionable truth-value of what is asserted (b). Further on in the text, yet another version of teleological reflective sense is ascribed to the above utterances: (c) *Part of Iran's goal is to divert attention from its own advancing nuclear programme* [The Times. 2023. 5 May]. It should be noted that though the latter utterance totally meets the standards of a conventional teleological explanation, there is more

to its semantic content than may seem *prima facie*. Arguably, there is a collateral reflective sense to it, suggesting some characteristic diplomatic shadiness in the misplaced final goal.

Totally unarticulated, ignored or for some reason unnoticed purposes in political discourse may exacerbate the process of teleological reflection and render the provision of a plausible 'purpose' related explanation untenable. Vacuous or indefinite final purposes may also provoke teleological reflective judgement: *The Sanctions policy does not have clear purpose. Western officials change their explanations about their goals* [The Financial Times. 2023. 3 July]; *No one knows <...> Labour's intentions* [The Daily Express. 2023. 16 May].

The purpose of the action concerned may also be intentionally hidden or misrepresented, as is shown in the following example: *In a letter addressed to "the British Pakistani/Kashmiri community in Dudley", Marco Longhi asked: "Will it be me, or Labour Party Parliamentary Candidate Sonia KUMAR?", underlining his rival's name. Critics claimed this was to point out Ms Kumar's British Indian background in the hope of persuading British Pakistani Muslims not to vote for her* [BBC News. 2024. 17 June].

On the other hand, the declared or alleged final purpose may as well be declined by the addressee on the basis of reflective thinking: *Labour and the Conservatives have criticised Reform UK leader <...> who told the BBC on Friday night the West "provoked" Russia's invasion of Ukraine* [BBC News. 2024. 22 June]; *Mr Farage repeatedly said he wants to create a "big, genuine mass movement of people" and "we need a good, strong opposition that can mobilise people in very large numbers". <...> However, Carl Emmerson, deputy director of the Institute for Fiscal Studies, external (IFS), said that "the package as a whole is problematic"* [BBC News. 2024. 17 June]. Thus, when it becomes obvious that there is a "divergence between the intuitive truth-conditions of an utterance and the literal truth-conditions" [Recanati, 2003, p. 142], this is where the teleological process of reflective sense construal starts.

Covert teleological assumptions with a utilitarian touch are also inherent in verbs expressing modality. According to standard grammar rules, finite adverbial clauses of purpose (characteristic of teleological explanations) "normally require a modal verb" [Chalker, Weiner. 1994, p. 325]. Modal verbs possess intrinsic teleological purport, either a plan, a possibility, a schedule, a putative purpose, or a moral obligation: *Victims must be compensated for the harm they have suffered, and impunity for the crimes committed must be tackled* [Government of the Netherlands. 2024. 2 April]; *At the heart of Kant's metaphysics stands the difference between the way world is and the way*

the world **ought** to be [The New York Times. 2024. 17 April]; *The White House and the European Union bear a huge responsibility. They **should** be using all their diplomatic and political leverage to build an international coalition to urge restraint – or risk a regional conflagration that could engulf the world* [The Daily Mail. 2023. 19 October]. Modal verbs may indicate subsidiary purposes without specifying the final goal, leaving the final purpose for reflective sense attribution, as in: *Nato **should maintain diplomatic and military pressure** on an embattled autocrat* [The Times. 2023. 3 July].

The bestowal of teleological reflective sense on an utterance occurs in coordination with assigned dependent and independent truth-value variables. This process can be represented symbolically in the following way:

$$(A \wedge p \wedge q \wedge r \wedge \infty) \vdash S.$$

Where: A – the dependent variable ‘Telos’;

p, q, r  $\infty$  – a potentially infinite concatenation of independent variables of semantically and teleologically relevant linguistic and non-linguistic factors;


S – the ascribed teleological reflective sense.

**Logos, ethos, pathos and reflective meaning construal**

Reflective constituents of meaning can be actualised with reference to the Aristotelian core components of rhetoric: *logos* (argument), *ethos* (social standing, reputation of the speaker) and *pathos* (the way the speaker brings home his ideas to

the addressee) [Aristotle, 1991]. Truth-conditions can be assigned to the proposition (*logos*) of an utterance. However, to adequately understand the semantic content of an utterance we cannot rely exclusively on the minimal proposition of the meaning declared, dismissing externalist cognitive principles of access semantics and specifically “the vast repository of non-linguistic knowledge representation” [Evans, 2019, p. 458]. *Ethos* and *pathos* may clash with *logos*. ‘Telos’, as a dependent variable, in the process of reflective sense engendering comes into coordinated purpose-based semantic relationship with *logos*, *ethos* and *pathos* as independent variables (Fig. 2).

*Ethos* as the track record of the speaker (however subjective or biased it may be) can trigger reflective thinking. If for some ethical, political, personal or professional reasons the reputation, the standing of the speaker or of the publication outlet does not meet the requirements of the addressee, it may provoke scepticism as to the moral validity and purposeful efficacy of an utterance, even though *prima facie* proposition may seem proper, as is indicated in the following assertions: *There is a strong sense by many in the Democratic Party – namely Barrack Hussein Obama – that Camala Harris is a Marxist fraud who cannot beat President Trump, and they are still holding out for someone ‘better’* [The Daily Mail. 2024. 26 July]; *Both Trump and Johnson are fabulists for whom the truth is simply what is politically or personally convenient at the time* [The Financial Times. 2023. 12 June]. So, as empirical material



**Fig. 2. Teleological reflective sense generating factors in political discourse**

shows, the semantic content of the utterances, where *ethos* comes into play, is subject to more alert truth-conditions scrutiny in the process of teleological reflective sense attribution. It should be noted that speakers are aware of the value of *ethos* and of reputational hazards caused by a marred track record, and promptly rebuff attempts to hurt their careers: *The former US president said references in news articles or by the TV network's hosts to his efforts to overrun the 2020 elections as "the Big Lie" <...> hurt his reputation and career* [The Daily Express. 2023. 31 July].

On the other hand, the sound reputation of the speaker in the eyes of the addressee may be an additional argument as to the potential fulfilment of truth-conditions: *Ben Wallace is the right choice to head Nato. He has the experience to keep this vital alliance together, no matter what Emmanuel Macron thinks <...> (He has) relevant experience, a proven track record and an individual and international stature* [The Daily Telegraph. 2023. 19 June]. Thus, *ethos* may affect the meaning of an utterance making it either morally more difficult to accept or, conversely, it may enhance its moral viability.

The same semantic interdependence may be noticed in the relationship between *logos* and *pathos*. *Pathos* denotes the way, when, where and how speakers bring home their ideas to the addressee. The style, the phrasing, the pitch, the tone may affect in some way the meaning of a minimal proposition (what is literally said) by provoking the ascription of teleological reflective senses: *She (Liz Truss) took all the flak <...> not trying to stir up more division <...> The sort who are mindfully concerned about this country and its reputation rather than mindlessly confrontational* [The Times. 2023. 21 June]. The identified purpose (*not trying to stir up more division*) is accompanied with the ascribed teleological reflective sense in the form of the moral assessment of the way ideas were presented to the public (*mindfully concerned about this country and its reputation rather than mindlessly confrontational*).

The behavioral pattern of the speaker is also context-sensitive and is subject to reflective thinking with the subsequent attribution of teleological reflective sense. Specifically, non-verbal components of communication can elicit teleological reflection and attribution of the reflective sense with a hazy touch to it: *Unlike British or French politicians, Olaf Scholz doesn't do pomp. Nor does he do charm. A man who screws up his eyes when he tries to smile, the German chancellor welcomed Ukraine's president with <...> characteristic stiffness. <...> The consequences may take months to be seen on the battlefield* [The Guardian. 2023. 16 May]. In the cited example, the utterance "*The consequences may take months to be seen on the battlefield*" performs a double function

of (a) the explicated teleological reflective sense ascribed to the utterance, and (b) a descriptive teleological explanation. We contend that ascription of teleological reflective sense in political discourse should be regarded as an immanent reflective thinking attribute, whether it is articulated or left latent.

Sublime reflection and teleological reflective sense ascription

Covert teleological assumptions can manifest themselves in the form of 'sublime reflection' (the term is taken from [Pillow 2000, p. 67]). In political discourse the sentiment of mendacity, discord, belligerence, offensive vitriol and an ignoble 'end' or a morally questionable objective may pass for being acceptable. It may happen as a result of a politically engineered sublimation of the meaning of a political term, a credo or a doctrine. Teleologically-based sublime reflection is inherently about sense construal. K. Pillow holds that "sublime reflection <...> struggles to make sense of all unfolding <...> (and) provides such a rich sight of interconnected meanings" [Pillow, 2000, p. 67]. Sublimation of political rhetoric may occur in pursuit of a seemingly "just cause" or "a sufficient reason" for any politically and morally sensitive action, including war, "stifling" moral principles and "making local necessities seem global and eternal" [Coady, 2007, p. 539].

It should be noted that sublimation is extremely context-sensitive: each speaker expressing political views has his own purposes and reasons for sublimation (or for desublimation) of politically important notions. *Brexit* as politically and socially sensitive issue for Britain may serve as an example: *Sunak maintains it is the Conservatives who have delivered "Brexit freedoms". "I was proud to support Brexit and it was the right decision for our country because we can take advantage of the opportunities that are now ahead of us. "We're signing free-trade deals around the world, which have now led to Brexit Britain overtaking France, the Netherlands and Japan, to become the fourth largest exporter in the world* [The Independent. 2024. 17 June]. In the assertions listed above the speaker justifies his sublime reflection pertaining to *Brexit* (*the right decision; have delivered "Brexit freedoms"*) with the help of teleological reflective judgement focused on consequences of the attained goal (*Brexit Britain (is) overtaking France, the Netherlands and Japan, to become the fourth largest exporter in the world*). Just the opposite stance, to the point of desublimation, is highlighted in the following utterances: "*Brexit has failed,*" *the former Brexit Party leader declared at the time. "We've not delivered on Brexit and the Tories have let us down very, very badly"* [Politico. 2023. 31 May]. Thus, the nomenclature of ascribed teleological reflective senses to an utterance is potentially infinite. This fact

is accounted for by numerous ‘Telos’-based variables of objective, subjective, dependent and independent nature. Sublimation is one of them.

**Conclusions.** A new semantic notion has been suggested – teleological reflective sense. It is posited as the linguistic or mental representation of the appraisal of the moral propriety of an utterance. The empirical evidence suggests that teleological reflection in terms of meaning creation in political discourse is essentially meta-teleological. It is the teleological reflective judgement about the moral validity of somebody else’s reflection. The act of ascription of teleological reflective sense manifests passing of a teleological reflective judgement by the addressee on the speaker’s intended meaning concomitant with causal and consequential apprehension of the original semantic content. The number of assigned teleological reflective senses to an utterance is potentially infinite as is potentially boundless multitude of variables that tend to be involved in the process of sense formation. The teleologically determined semantic differences between the speaker’s meaning and the meaning recovered by the addressee in political discourse may be brought about by objective and subjective factors: (a) linguistic and non-linguistic; (b) rational and intuitive; (c) by the factors of political feasibility and moral propriety.

**The prospects for further research.** The systematic analysis of argumentative underpinnings and the ‘purpose’ related specificity of relations between independent and dependent variables in assertions with teleological semantic content should be advisable.

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