TWITTER COMMUNICATION OF FRENCH POLITICIANS AS A REACTION TO RUSSIAN FULL-SCALE INVASION OF UKRAINE (BASED ON THE ACCOUNTS OF VALÉRIE PÉCRESSE, ÉRIC ZEMMOUR AND MARINE LE PEN)
Abstract
Nowadays the civilized world is in the process of instant developing, scientific progress and active implementation of modern technologies. New media as a part of modern technologies can be a tool for preventing wars or media coverage of them. Starting February 24, 2022, social networks were flooded with information about Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine coming from Ukrainian and foreign political actors who used social media to communicate with their target audience. In this article Twitter has been explored as a means of political communication, Twitter accounts of French politicians (Valérie Pécresse, Éric Zemmour and Marine Le Pen) and their reaction to the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine over a period of January-April 2022 has been analyzed. Due to the versatility of the topic our research has been conducted using quantitative content, qualitative content, and thematic analysis, as well as elements of critical discourse analysis. The article concludes that despite belonging to right wing political parties, French politicians instrumentalise the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine differently. Center-right Valérie Pécresse supports Ukraine, approves sanctions against Russia, calls for help and decisive action from the EU and NATO, does not approve of EU expansion, referring to Ukraine's accession to the EU, and the end of cooperation of French industries with Russia. Whereas far-right Éric Zemmour and Marine Le Pen demonstrate an ambiguous attitude: they respect the sovereignty of Ukraine, call for humanitarian aid and condemn the Russian invasion, but at the same time they demonstrate a pro-Russian position, continue Russian narratives about the responsibility of the USA and NATO, use Russian transliteration of Ukrainian cities and territories, oppose sanctions, and call for peace, avoiding the direct nomination of war.
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